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Note
Second Impact
Liability in Nebraska
Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d 831 (1974).
I. INTRODUCTION
Friedrich v. Anderson' represents Nebraska's entry into the con-
tinuing national battle for supremacy between the conflicting doc-
trines of automobile crashworthiness represented by Evans v.
General Motors Corp.2 and Larsen v. General Motors Corp.8
Their clashing concept as to the appropriate legal principle con-
trolling manufacturers' liability for design defects producing en-
hanced injuries in motor vehicle accidents but not causing or con-
tributing to the initial collision, has led to a "War between the
States" unsurpassed since 1865. 4
The concept of "enhanced injury" refers to essentially two types
of cases.5 First, there are those cases in which the injuries inflicted
1. 191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d 831 (1974).
2. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966). In
Evans, plaintiff's decedent suffered injuries and death while driving
a car which was struck on the side by another. Plaintiff claimed de-
cedent's injuries were enhanced because the automobile manufactured
by the defendant was designed with an "X" frame, rather than the
supposedly superior perimeter frame used by their competitors. The
action was grounded on specific negligence, implied warranty, and
strict tort liability. The suit was dismissed for failure to state a claim
against defendant upon which relief could be granted.
3. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). In Larsen, the plaintiff-driver's injuries,
sustained in a head-on collision, were enhanced by due to the rear-
ward displacement of the claimed defectively designed steering shaft
of a Corvair automobile. The Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court
decision granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, stat-
ing that collisions were the foreseeable result of normal use of autos
and therefore defendants owed users of its product a duty of due care.
The court further stated that where injuries are caused by the manu-
facturer's failure to use reasonable care to avoid subjecting the user
of its products to an unreasonable risk of injury, general negligence
principles should apply.
4. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 317 A.2d 494 (Md. Spec. App. 1974).
5. See Houser, Crashworthiness: Defective Product Design-Secondary
Impact Liability in Texas, 4 ST. MARY'S L. REv. 303 (1972); Katz, Lia-
bility of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger
Cars, 69 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1956); Nader & Page, Automobile Design
and the Judicial Process, 55 CAlIF. L. REv. 645 (1967); Comment,
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upon a person not occupying the automobile are enhanced by the
vehicle's design.6 The second type, more commonly known as
"crashworthiness" or "second impact" cases, concern enhanced in-
juries to the occupant of a vehicle whose design is at issue.7 Current-
ly state or federal courts in twenty-seven jurisdictions have been
confronted with automobile accident cases involving enhanced in-
jury. These jurisdictions are almost evenly divided on the issue of
allowing injured plaintiffs to recover. Thirteen deny recovery,8
basically following the Evans rationale, and fourteen allow recovery,
looking to Larsen for guidance.9 Nebraska's position in this align-
Torts: Automobile Manufacturer's Liabilitl for "Secondary Impact
Injuries," 23 OKLA. L. REv. 296 (1970); Comment, Manufacturer's Lia-
bility for Defective Automobile Design, 42 WASH. L. REv. 601 (1967);
Note, 80 HAuv. L. Rzv. 688 (1967); Note, 1969 I.. L.F. 396 (1969); Note,
52 IowA L. REv. 953 (1967); Note, 42 NOT DAJ-s LAw. 111 (1966);
Note, 21 S.C.L. Rv. 451 (1969); Note, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 299 (1969);
Note, 24 V~m. L. Ray. 862 (1971).
6. See Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972);
Mieher v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869 (1972).
7. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) and
Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 836 (1966).
8. Marshall v. Ford Motor Co., 446 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1971); Schemel
v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 945 (1968) (applying Indiana law); Alexander v. Seaboard Air
Line R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971); McClung v. Ford Motor
Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Schumard v. General Motors
Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.. Ohio 1967); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264
F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Mieher v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 802,
278 N.E.2d 869 (1972); Perez v. Ford Motor Co., CCH Prod. Liab. Rptr.
6901 (E.D. La. 1972); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 317 A.2d 494
(Md. Spec. App. 1974); General Motors Corp. v. Howard, 244 So. 2d
726 (Miss. 1971); Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss.
1970); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1970);
Devaney v. Sarno, 299 A.2d 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1973); Burkhard v.
Short, 28 Ohio App. 141, 275 N.E.2d 632 (1971); O'Connor v. American
Honda Motor Co., CCH Prod. Liab. Rptr. 6930 (Super. Ct., King
County, Wash. 1973).
9. State appellate courts, or federal district and circuit courts of appeals
declaring state law following Larsen include: Turcotte v. Ford Motor
Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying Rhode Island law); Passwa-
ters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972) (applying
Iowa law); Bremier v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949
(D.D.C. 1972); Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303
(E.D. Wis. 1970); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064
(E.D. Pa. 1969); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d
1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11
Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970); Friend v. General Motors
Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968), cert. denied, 225 Ga.
240, 167 S.E.2d 926 (1969); Brandenburger v. Toyota Sales, USA, Inc.,
513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973); Bohm v. Triumph Corp., 341 N.Y.S.2d 846
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1973); May v. Portland Jeep, Inc., 509 P.2d 24 (Ore.
1973); Mickle v. Blackmon, 25! S.C. 202, 165 SX..2d 173 (1969); Eng-
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ment is stated in Friedrich. This note will first examine the Ne-
braska Supreme Court's'0 pronouncement of automobile crash-
worthiness law, and then will analyze the possible effect of Fried-
rich on Nebraska's doctrine of strict liability.
II. AUTOMOBILE CRASHWORTHINESS LAW
IN NEBRASKA
On January 5, 1969, the plaintiff was a passenger in his auto-
mobile being driven by his wife. The auto was struck from the left
by another automobile, throwing plaintiff forward and to the left so
that his head struck the gearshift lever knob which was in reverse
position.1  The plaintiff, previously suffering from a diabetic
condition which impaired his vision, is now limited to light percep-
tion as a result of his impact with the knob. Suit was brought
against Chrysler Motors Corporation and Chrysler Corporation as
seller and manufacturer of plaintiff's auto, respectively. The peti-
tion alleged that the knob was defectively designed, that the "sec-
ond impact" caused specific injuries to plaintiff's eye, and that
defendants were liable on theories of specific negligence, breach of
warranty and strict liability. Defendants moved for summary
judgment on all three of plaintiff's theories, and the trial court
sustained these motions ruling that
shift lever knob so as to be incapable of producing the injury to
this plaintiff or incapable of causing injury in the event of colli-
berg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973); Ellithorpe v. Ford
Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973).
10. The case was decided by a division of the Nebraska Supreme Court
consisting of Judges Spencer, Smith and Clinton, and District Judges
Brodkey and Hastings. Judge Smith did not participate in the deci-
sion. Article 2, section 5 of the Nebraska Constitution provides:
Whenever necessary for the prompt submission and deter-
mination of causes, the supreme court may appoint judges
of the district court to act as associate judges of the supreme
court, sufficient in number, with the judges of the supreme
court [seven in number], to constitute two divisions of the
court of five judges in each division. Whenever judges of the
district court are so acting the court shall sit in two divisions,
and four of the judges thereof shall be necessary to constitute
a quorum.
In view of the circumstances surrounding the decision, that is,
Judge Smith's failure to participate and the accession of Judge Brod-
key to the Supreme Court shortly after this decision, the opinion repre-
sents, at most, the views of three Nebraska Supreme Court Judges.
11. The Court stated that the gear shift was in "low position." 191 Neb.
at 725, 217 N.W.2d at 833. The appellant's brief, however, states that
the gear shift was in reverse, citing the trial court's record. Brief for
Appellant at 8, Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d 831
(1974).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
sion with another vehicle.12
Plaintiff appealed the decision.
The Nebraska Supreme Court formulated the issue in the case as
follows:
[T]he precise question before us is the nature or exteit of the
duty which an automobile manufacturer owes to the users of its
products in the event of injury or enhanced injury resulting from
a "second impact" or collision of a passenger with the inside of an
automobile following an initial external collision.' 5
By framing the question in this manner, the court suspended itself 14
between the poles of Evans, which states that a manufacturer's
duty is to produce a vehicle reasonably fit for its intended purpose
(such intended purpose not including collisions) 15 and Larsen,
which states a manufacturer's duty is to use reasonable care in de-
sign so as to make an auto safe for its 'foreseeable and intended use
(including the foreseeable possibility of collision).16 Both Evans
and Larsen are negligence cases and their resolution of the duty is-
sue and connected foreseeability issue necessitates a discussion of
basic negligence concepts.
In most products liability cases, the court is not troubled by the
task of explicitly determining whether the defendant owes the
plaintiff a duty of reasonable care. The general scope of such duty
is well established: manufacturers must provide products that are
reasonably safe for their foreseeable use.' 7  In "second impact"
cases, however, the manufacturer contends that the plaintiff-occu-
pant's injuries resulted from an unintended use' s or misuse of the
product-the auto's collision with another object-and therefore the
injuries were "unforeseeable" as a matter -of law and outside the
scope of their duty.
12. Friedrich v. Anderson, No. 238 (Dist. Ct. Knox County, Neb., Feb. 27,
1973).
13. 191 Neb. at 727, 217 N.W.2d at 833-34.
14. Id. The court stated that two distinet theories of "second impact" duty
were urged by the respective parties., However, it appears that the
cases urged by the parties were reversed by the court. Plaintiff's po-
sition is supported by Larsen and defendant's position is supported by
Evans.
15. 359 F.2d at 825.
16. 391 F.2d at 504.
17. See e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916); RESTATEVENT (SEcoND) or, TORTS § ,395 (1965); 2 HARPER &
JAMES, THE LAW Or TORTS §§ 28.3-.9 (1958).
18. "'Intended use' is only a convenient adaptation of the basic test of
'reasonable forseeability' framed to more specifically fit the factual
situations out of which arise questions of mahufacturer's liability for
negligence." Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc.,. 308 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir.
1962).
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The arguments presented by the litigants in Friedrich illustrate
the contrasting application of the term "foreseeability" and the ef-
fect which the respective formulations have on determining the duty
of reasonable care in "second impact" cases.19 Foreseeability of
risk is usually based on two related elements-likelihood or prob-
ability of harm if reasonable care is not exercised and the manufac-
turer's actual or constructive knowledge of the risk.20 The requi-
site degree of probability necessary to activate the duty of reason-
able care has been formulated in various ways. Learned Hand
stated that "[the injurious result] has got to be one of those con-
sequences which is not entirely outside the range of expectation or
probability, as ordinary men view it." 21 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts limits the requirement of reasonable care by the manu-
facturer of chattels "to those who use [the product] for a purpose
for which the manufacturer should expect it to be used and to those
whom he should expect to be endangered by its probable use."22
If these authorities are read to indicate that the duty of reasonable
care of a manufacturer of chattels is strictly limited to "intended
use," that is, that an automobile is intended to provide transporta-
tion for persons and goods-but does not include predictable con-
tingencies which are statistically known to arise in the course of
such operation-then clearly the Evans formulation of a manu-
facturer's duty should prevail.2 3
The concept of "intended use," however, has been accorded
broader application by several jurisdictions and has been held not
19. Defendant argued that foreseeability of harm is one factor to consider
in determining duty, but is not the only test. Policy and social re-
quirements of the time and community must be considered. Assuming
that accidents are reasonably foreseeable, should that be the sole test,
the manufacturer's duty would be intolerably extended. Brief of Ap-
pellee at 24-27, Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d 831
(1974). Plaintiff, conversely, argued that even the slightest degree of
foreseeability of harm creates a duty on the part of a manufacturer
to protect against injuries to plaintiff. Since auto accidents are rea-
sonably foreseeable, and occupants of autos are injured by "second
impact" collisions, a manufacturer owes a duty to prevent same. Brief
of Appellant at 36, Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d
831 (1974).
20. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 361 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
21. The Mars, 9 F.2d 183, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
22. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965). See also comment j,
"Unforeseeable use or manner of use."
The liability stated in this Section is limited to persons who
are endangered and the risks which are created in the course
of uses of the chattel which the manufacturer should reason-
ably anticipate. In the absence of special reason to expect
otherwise, the maker is entitled to assume that his product
will be put to normal use, for which the product is intended
or appropriate ....
23. See note 14, supra.
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to preclude manufacturers' responsibility for the probable ancillary
consequences of normal use.24 A manufacturer cannot ignore prob-
able "misuse" of his product.
"Intended use" is not an inflexible formula to be apodictically ap-
plied to every case. Normally a seller or manufacturer is entitled
to anticipate that the product he deals in will be used only for the
purposes for which it is manufactured and sold; thus he is expected
to reasonably foresee only injuries arising in the course of such use.
However, he must also be expected to anticipate the environment
which is normal for the use of his product .... 25
The Larsen court applied this concept to the use of automobiles in
the following manner:
Automobiles are made for use on the roads and highways in trans-
porting persons and cargo to and from various points. This in-
tended use cannot be carried out without encountering in varying
degrees the statistically proved hazard of injury-producing impacts
of various types.2 6
After looking at authorities on both sides of the "intended use" or
foreseeability of harm issue, which is a determinant of the manu-
facturer's duty of care, the resolution of the question seems to
turn on the court's determination of public 'policy.2 7
The Nebraska Supreme Court, after weighing the competing ar-
guments and policy considerations raised by the duty issue in
Friedrich, referred to Nebraska Jury Instruction 11.0328 for guid-
ance. The court held that the accidental collision of an auto-
mobile with another automobile or object, while the automobile is
being used for its intended purpose, is a use which a manufacturer
should reasonably expect.29 This holding brings Nebraska under the
Larsen umbrella. Thus, in Nebraska a manufacturer's duty to use
reasonable care in designing its vehicle includes the duty not to
subject the user to unreasonable risk of injury from the foreseeable
possibility of collision with other automobiles. In other words,
the auto manufacturer must exercise reasonable care to protect
24. See Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); Larsen
v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Mazzi v. Green-
lee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1963); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway,
Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Dyson v. General Motors Corp.,
298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
25. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1962).
26. 491 F.2d at 501-02.
27. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MIcH. L. Rxv.
543, 562-69 (1962).
28. "A manufacturer of goods has a duty to use reasonable care in the
design of goods to protect those who will use the goods from unrea-
sonable risk of harm while the goods are being used for their intended
purpose or any purpose which could be reasonably expected." NEB.
JuRY INSTRUcTION No. 11.03 (1969).
29. 191 Neb. at 732, 217 N.W.2d at 836.
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persons using his product from possible injuries sustained in "second
impact" collisions. In so holding, the Nebraska court specified
that it did not require an auto manufacturer to design a product in-
capable of producing harm. This result comports with current legal
thought, no court, to date, having held that an automobile manufac-
turer must build a "crashproof" product.30
Having held that an accidental automobile collision while the
car was being used for its intended purpose was reasonably fore-
seeable and that an automobile manufacturer must protect the user
of its product from unreasonable risk of harm, the court affirmed
the trial court's decision. According to the decision, the evidence
concerning the gear shift lever knob was "not sufficient that rea-
sonable minds could properly find that the defectively designed
product created a forseeable and unreasonable risk of harm."31
One difficulty presented by the supreme court's decision is that
the trial court based its decision to grant the defendant's motions
for summary judgment on the absence of a duty to design a shift
knob incapable of producing or causing injury in the event of colli-
sion.32 That is, since collisions were not an "intended use" of the
product, the manufacturer had no duty to protect the plaintiff from
an unreasonable risk of harm. It was this point which the litigants
briefed to the supreme court and to which, presumably, their evi-
dence in the trial court was addressed. Clearly the supreme court
resolved the duty issue in favor of the plaintiff, finding automobile
collisions reasonably foreseeable. By proceeding to resolve the
negligence issue, however, the court decided the factual question of
Chrysler's possible breach of duty. Such a decision was made upon
meager evidence since the plaintiff had not been allowed to pro-
ceed to the merits in the lower court; rather, summary judgment
had been granted based on the absence of the defendants' duty to
protect the plaintiff from unreasonable risk of harm when its pro-
duct was subjected to an unintended use-a question of law.
A further difficulty with the decision is that the plaintiff framed
his petition in the alternative, alleging defendants were liable on
theories of specific negligence, breach of warranty and strict liabil-
ity.33 Assuming the supreme court correctly proceeded to decide
the factual question-that the shift knob design did not create a
foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm, and thus that Chrysler
was not negligent as a matter of law-the court's rationale in affirm-
ing the summary judgment must have been that second impact
liability will be recognized in Nebraska only upon a showing of
30. Comment, 12 DuQuFsNE L. REV. 603, 607 (1974).
31. 191 Neb. at 732-33, 217 N.W.2d at 836 (emphasis added).
32. See note 12, supra.
33, 191 Neb. at 725, 217 N.W,2d at 83$,
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negligence and not when the theory of recovery is strict liability or
breach of warranty.
There are no apparent means to ascertain whether the court
considered the merits of plaintiff's breach of warranty theory in
Friedrich. Although the syllabus indicates that warranty was a
basis for the decision 3 4 there is no mention of the Nebraska war-
ranty statutes"5 in the opinion, and the word "warranty" was
mentioned in passing at only three points.36 It can only be assumed,
since the court acknowledged the existence of plaintiff's warranty
allegation, that the court considered sub silentio whether an allega-
tion of manufacturer's breach of warranty constituted a valid basis
for recovery in a second collision suit. Subsequent denial of relief
to the plaintiff would at least indicate that no breach existed in
Friedrich, and potentially could point to the court's decision that
a warranty theory is an improper basis for recovery in any second
collision suit in Nebraska.3 7 However, any conclusion on this
aspect of the case is so speculative that further examination would
be of questionable value. Nevertheless, there is room for more
constructive analysis of the possible implications of Friedrich for
the law of strict liability in Nebraska.
III. STRICT LIABILITY IN NEBRASKA
AFTER FRIEDRICH
There can be little doubt that the supreme court decided Fried-
34. 191 Neb. at 724, 217 N.W.2d at 832.
35. NEs. U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to -315.
36. The court noted that one of the bases of plaintiff's action in Evans was
implied warranty. 191 Neb. at 727, 217 N.W.2d at 834. However, the
Evans court stated: "It is not alleged that General Motors expressly
warranted its auto to have side rails or to be capable of protecting
a driver in broadside collisions; nor can such warranty be implied
from the allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint." 359 F.2d at
825. Implied warranty was also mentioned in the court's reference to
Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971). Finally,
the court acknowledged that breach of warranty was one of plaintiff's
theories for relief. 191 Neb. at 725, 217 N.W.2d at 835.
37. There appears to be no instance in which the warranty theory has been
successfully employed in a second collision case. This is the expected
result, especially in instances of express warranty, because with the
existing state of the art it would be absurd to expect an auto manu-
facturer or dealer to warrant expressly that the purchaser of its prod-
uct would not be injured in any collision involving that product. Fur-
ther, courts in two cases have taken the position that in situations
where the law does not require a manufacturer to make an automobile
that will fully protect its occupants in a collision, the law does not
imply that a manufacturer warrants his product to be adequate for
such a purpose. See Schumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp.
311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); and McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp.
17 (S.D. W, Va. 1971), affd per curiam, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1973).
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rich on the basis of negligence theory. The court's holding tracks
the language of Nebraska Jury Instruction 11.03,8 which in turn
looks to section 395 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for au-
thority.39 The court clarified the basis for its decision 'by stating:
"[T]here was no substantial competent evidence from which one
reasonably could draw an inference of negligence on the part of
defendants proximately causing plaintiff's injuries. '40  Given this
formulation, it may seem that the case has no impact on Nebraska's
law of strict liability. But such a conclusion is contrary to
the fact that the plaintiff set forth three causes of action in
his petition, 41 and motions for summary judgment were granted by
the trial court dismissing all three causes. The supreme court, in
ruling on the correctness of the trial court's decision, could reason-
ably be expected to have examined whether the plaintiff's case
should have proceeded to trial on any or all causes of action, thus
necessarily considering the strict liability question.
The Nebraska Supreme Court adopted strict liability in tort
with its holding in Kohler v. Ford Motor Co.4 2
We hold that a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article he placed in the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect which causes
an injury to a human being rightfully using that product.43
This broad rule was bolstered by the court two years later in
Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co." Chief Justice White,
in the majority opinion, pointed out that the doctrine of strict
liability in tort was designed to place the risk of defect-caused in-
juries on the manufacturer of the chattel, thus easing the burden of
injury for plaintiffs who were often less able to bear the costs of
the loss. 4 5 From these two cases which set forth Nebraska's strict
liability law prior to Friedrich, it can be seen that the key element
for a plaintiff to establish for recovery on a strict liability theory
is that a defect in the product caused his injury.
38. See note 28, supra.
39. That section is entitled, "Negligent Manufacture of Chattel Dangerous
Unless Carefully Made." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395
(1965).
40. 191 Neb. at 733, 217 N.W.2d at 836-37 (emphasis added).
41. See note 33, supra.
42. 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
43. 187 Neb. at 436, 191 N.W.2d at 606. The court cited as the rationale
for its holding: RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Pros-
ser, The Fall uf the Citadel, 50 MN. L. REv. 791 (1966); Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960).
44. 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973). See also Note, 7 CRE-GHTON L.
REv. 396 (1974); Note, 53 NEB. L. REV. 114 (1974).
45. 190 Neb. at 562, 209 N.W.2d at 653.
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If the court considered sub silentio the merits of plaintiff's
claim for recovery under the strict liability theory, its decision must
have been that the product which injured plaintiff (the shift knob),
placed on the market and used without inspection for defects, was
not defective. The court's language at the conclusion of the opinion,
however, suggests that it accepted the fact that the product was de-
fectively designed.46 If the court actually disposed of the case on
strict liability grounds, as well as negligence theory, and if the court
agreed that the shift knob was defectively designed and still decided
against the plaintiff, an element not present in Kohler and Hawkins
may have been added to Nebraska's law of strict liability.
The guiding lights of strict liability theory have been, and are,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 47 and cases based on sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 48 These decisions
-have been cited side by side as standing for the same formulation of
strict liability law. It has been asserted, however, that each pre-
scribes a different 'burden for the plaintiff to sustain if he is to re-
cover under a strict liability theory. Greenman sets forth the rule
that a "manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspec-
tion for defects proves to 'have a defect which causes injury to a
human 'being."49 In an attempt to prevent the manufacturer from
becoming the absolute insurer of every injury resulting from the
use of its products, 50 section 402A 'places a further burden on the
plaintiff to prove the product was "unreasonably dangerous."51
46. "[The evidence] is not sufficient that reasonable minds could properly
find that the defectively designed product created a foreseeable and
unreasonable risk of harm." 191 Neb. at 733, 217 N.W.2d at 836 (em-
phasis added).
47. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or ToRTs § 402A (1965).
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his prop-
erty is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to property, if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and(b) it is expected to and does reach the consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it was
sold.(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prep-
aration and sale of his product, and(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
-49 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. This rule is
mirrored in Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601
(1971).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965).
51. See note 49, supra.
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This element of "unreasonable danger" may have been injected
into Nebraska's law of strict liability by the supreme court when it
stated in Friedrich that it could not be found "that the defectively
designed product created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of
harm.'52 The difficulty with this language is that it closely paral-
lels the negligence standard. To determine whether a reasonable
manufacturer should have produced the product (a necessary in-
quiry to decide negligence) or whether the product is unreasonably
dangerous (a necessary inquiry to decide strict liability) requires
the utilization of the Same criteria-probability of injury, degree
of possible harm, and cost of the design implementation. 3 These
criteria, however, are viewed from different perspectives. The
negligence standard looks to the manufacturer's conduct. Assuming
the manufacturer possessed knowledge of the product's condition,
would he then have acted unreasonably by placing it on the market?
Conversely, the strict liability standard looks to the product and
whether a reasonable manufacturer would have placed the product
on the market knowing of its defective condition. Thus, in strict
liability, except for the lack of defendant-manufacturer's scienter,
the test to determine liability is the same as that for negligence.54
Stressing the importance of this distinction, the California Supreme
Court recently refused to place on a plaintiff the additional burden
of proving the product "unreasonably dangerous" as a prerequisite
to recovery for injuries suffered in a second collision accident be-
cause such an element "rings of negligence." 55 The absence of the
burden upon the plaintiff to establish defendant's scienter is a
significant benefit to be derived from the use of strict liability.
Thus, if the Nebraska Supreme Court, by its holding in Friedrich,
added the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement to the plaintiff's
burden for recovery on a strict liability theory this would be a sig-
nificant change from the previously enunciated law of strict lia-
bility in Nebraska.
In the final analysis, the effect the court's decision was intended
to or will have upon this state's law of strict liability is uncertain.
The court did not cite Kohler or Hawkins, which, as previously
mentioned, constitute the foundation of existing strict liability law
on Nebraska. Indeed, the court did not talk in terms of strict lia-
bility in its opinion.
52. 191 Neb. at 733, 217 N.W.2d at 836 (emphasis added).
53. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d. 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
54. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. 5, 15 (1965).
55. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972). See also Note, 61 CATI. L. REv. 656(1973); Note, 7 CREiGHTON L. REv. 434 (1973); Note, 11 DuQuEsNE L.
REv. 726 (1973).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In Friedrich, the court clearly decided that an automobile's
collision with other objects during its intended use is a reasonably
foreseeable occurrence and therefore the auto manufacturer has
a duty to design its product to protect users from an unreasonable
risk of harm. In so holding, the supreme court has allied Nebraska
with the growing number of states following the Larsen decision.
The court's decision on the merits, however, raises troublesome
issues. The most reasonable reading of Friedrich leads to the
conclusion that the defendants' conduct was judged solely on the
basis of negligence theory and no violation of the standard of care
was found. If this is the case, the court failed to consider the ad-
ditional theories of breach of warranty and strict liability advanced
by the plaintiff. Thus, the full meaning of this decision awaits
further articulation and clarification in future second impact cases.
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